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Private Prisons, Private Governance:
Essay On Developments In Private-Sector
Resistance To Privatized Immigration Detention
Danielle C. Jefferis*
INTRODUCTION
Two diametrically opposed events impacting America’s for-profit prison industry
occurred within two weeks of each other in 2019. On March 19, 2019, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced its opinion in Nielsen v. Preap.1 In that case, a majority of justices upheld
a broad interpretation of the federal government’s immigration detention authority with
respect to certain noncitizens in removal proceedings.2 In effect, the Court’s decision
expanded the category of people subject to mandatory migration-related confinement—a
system of incarceration that currently incarcerates more than 50,000 people per day in
mostly private prisons and continues to expand.3 The decision marked a victory for the
private prison industry.
However, just two weeks prior, the industry experienced a significant loss. In an
unprecedented move, JPMorgan Chase, one of the nation’s largest banks, announced it
would no longer finance or invest in private prison corporations.4 Wells Fargo soon
followed.5 These banks’ divestment from the private-prison industry represented a loss of
millions of dollars of capital for the corporations managing and profiting from privatized
immigration detention, sending a compelling signal from Wall Street that a company’s
support for the Trump administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy of immigration
enforcement matters. Stocks of the two largest private-prison companies took a drastic hit
in the aftermath of the banks’ announcements.6 Soon, at least six more of the nation’s
*

Clinical Teaching Fellow, Civil Rights Clinic, University of Denver College of Law. I am grateful to the
work of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy Volume 15 Board of Editors. One of the
primary challenges in writing a piece about an industry that is changing as rapidly as the subject of this one
is ensuring the accounts, analysis, and sources are as up-to-date as possible. I have endeavored to meet that
challenge here but any errors on that front or others are mine.
1
139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).
2
Id.
3
See infra Subpart I(B).
4
See, e.g., Emily S. Rueb, JPMorgan Chase Stops Funding Private Prison Companies, and Immigration
Activists Applaud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/business/jp-morganprisons.html.
5
Dennis Carter, Bank of America is Now the Only Big Bank ‘Profiting from Family Separation’, REWIRE
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), https://rewire.news/article/2019/04/10/bank-of-america-is-now-the-only-big-bankprofiting-from-family-separation/.
6
Morgan Simon, In Wake of Wells Fargo Hearing, Private Prison Stocks Take Big Hit, FORBES (Mar. 15,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/03/15/in-wake-of-wells-fargo-hearing-privateprison-stocks-take-big-hit/#535e7aa91a3b (reporting stocks of two largest private-prison companies, GEO
Group and CoreCivic, dropped sixteen and eight percent respectively in the day following banks’
divestment announcement).
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largest banks had committed publicly to ending financing for the private-prison industry,
leaving the industry with a reported eighty-seven percent financing gap, falling credit
ratings, and investor fallback.7 By October 2019, all publicly known banking partners for
one of the industry’s leaders had committed to withdrawing their financial support, and the
leading stock prices for the industry’s top companies were “near historic lows.”8
For advocates of decarceration and more humane immigration-enforcement
protocols, the banks’ divestment from the private prison industry is one development in a
series of efforts of people and organizations disavowing expectations of humane public
governance and, instead, insisting and relying on private governance institutions to impose
accountability and push for change. When the government fails to govern, people and
groups may turn to private governance mechanisms to challenge the status quo.9 Private
governance institutions are the means by which indivdiuals, organizations, and
communities aim to address the needs that public governance has failed to address.10 In
other words, “[p]rivate governance institutions provide governance without
government.”11 As for Chase, Wells Fargo, and the finance companies that followed them,
the banks’ exits from the private prison industry came after directed campaigns by
advocates and activists demanding the companies cease support for corporations
responsible for the Trump administration’s immigration-enforcement policies.12 Of the
numerous recent examples of private governance action in the field of private prisons, this
Essay describes certain shareholder actions and divestment activities.13
In examining shareholder actions and divestment activities in this Essay, I write
through the lens of decarceration—that is, from the premise that the the elimination of
privatized confinement on all levels is the goal14—and I focus on privatized federal
immigration detention. I do this for two reasons: first, the U.S. immigration detention
system is the most privatized in the world and is significantly more privatized than the
system of criminal incarceration.15 Second, with respect to immigration enforcement, the
federal government has demonstrated a recent commitment to governing in a manner
Morgan Simon, GEO Group Running Out of Banks as 100% of Known Banking Partners Say ‘No’ to the
Private Prison Sector, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/09/30/geo-group-runs-out-of-banks-as-100-of-bankingpartners-say-no-to-the-private-prison-sector/#63c7c2273298 (last updated Oct. 11, 2019).
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance
Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 67, 67 (2011).
10
Id. (citing Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A
COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 8-9 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2008) (“Private
governance institutions are limitless in their variety. Political science, sociology, law, and economics
literature describes hundreds of variations of private governance institutions throughout the world that have
developed their own community-based rules for resource management and conflict resolution.”).
11
Roberts, supra note 9.
12
See Rueb, supra note 4.
13
Professor Jonathan M. Gilligan refers to these two private governance institutions as carrots and sticks—
shareholder actions being the carrots, enticing industry actors to engage for purposes of change, and
divestment actions being the sticks, signifying an exit from the industry. See generally Jonathan M.
Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Governance, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 179 (2018).
14
See generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005).
15
MARY SMALL, DET. WATCH NETWORK, A TOXIC RELATIONSHIP: PRIVATE PRISONS AND U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (2016) (“[I]n addition to being remarkable for its size, the U.S. immigration
detention system is an outlier for the degree to which it has been privatized.”).
7
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contrary to the goals of decarceration. The government is also is uniquely situated to evade
certain public governance measures, particularly efforts by state or local jurisdictions
seeking to govern in this area, due in part to issues of federalism.
Private governance actions may be one method to draw attention to the scope of and
conditions in for-profit immigration detention centers, to improve those conditions, and to
stop the overall growth of the immigration detention apparatus. This Essay has three parts.
Part I describes the state of privatized confinement in the United States, from the history
of for-profit imprisonment to its modern scope to the conditions in private immigration
prisons across the United States. Part II describes the shortcomings of public governance
to advance the goal of decarceration or, at minimum, exercise sufficient oversight of the
private-prison industry. Part III then examines recent shareholder and divestment actions
targeted at the for-profit prison industry, specifically privatized immigration detention.
I. THE STATE OF PRIVATE CONFINEMENT IN AMERICA
Commercial interests in American incarceration have existed for centuries, gaining
prominence first with the emergence of prison labor exploitation on plantations throughout
the antebellum South.16 While America’s system of incarceration is arguably more
regulated today than it was then, the private sector has nonetheless retained a significant
stakehold in all confinement systems, including immigration-related confinement.17 This
Part provides a brief history of privatized confinement and sketches the scope of modern
private immigration detention, as well as the conditions in the prisons where the federal
government confines people for putatively “civil” reasons.18
A. History
The private sector has played a notable role in American confinement since at least
the Reconstruction era.19 As criminal punishment in the United States transitioned from the
use of capital punishment, banishment, and public flogging to the use of incarceration, state
and local governments began searching for ways to account for the cost of confining people
for lengthier periods of time.20 One way to do this was to force the people in the
government’s custody to work. The modern private prison industry grew out the
antebellum practice of forced labor on prison plantations, which themselves grew out of
slavery and other labor-driven industries.21 As Professor Sharon Dolovich explains in her
16

SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON 16–21 (Penguin Press eds. 2018); Sharon Dolovich, supra note 14, at
450–51 (“In the early [American] penitentiaries, prison labor was introduced as part of rehabilitative
programs, but it quickly became the means through which state governments could recoup the costs to the
state treasury of imprisoning criminals. Indeed, the history of nineteenth-century American prisons is a
history of contracting between the state and private interests for the use of convict labor in efforts on both
sides to achieve financial gain.”).
17
See, e.g., EMILY RYO AND IAN PEACOCK, The Landscape of Immigration Detention in the United States,
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 14 (2018) (approximately two-thirds of the daily population of immigration
detainees are confined in for-profit prisons).
18
See generally René Lima-Marín & Danielle C. Jefferis, It’s Just Like Prison: Is a Civil (Nonpunitive)
System of Immigration Detention Theoretically Possible?, 96 DENV. L. REV. 955 (2019).
19
SHANE BAUER, supra note 16, at 16–21; Sharon Dolovich, supra note 14, at 450–51.
20
Dolovich, supra note 14, at 450–51.
21
Bauer, supra note 16, at 19; Dolovich, supra note 14, at 451 (“Although convict leasing was found
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detailed account of the history of commercial interests and American incarceration, “At the
[Civil W]ar’s end, demand for convict labor was high, as those who had previously relied
on slave labor found themselves in need of a pool of cheap workers.”22 Some plantations
and factories were privately owned; others were government-run.23 All, however, profited
from enslaved labor.24
Later, from the end of the nineteenth century to the early-to-mid twentieth century,
prison labor contracts became frought with controversy and corruption.25 Conditions for
the people in the prisons and the labor camps were dreadful and featured severe abuse and
“utter indifference to whether [prisoners] lived or died.”26 Private companies also began to
take advantage of the governments with which they contracted, failing to perform to the
contracts’ full terms and then fighting states’ legal battles in court.27 This era of
commercialized incarceration soon gave way to the modern system that emerged in the
1980s. This was a system that bears simultaneously different and similar features when
compared to the one of the last century, much like the American carceral enterprise as a
whole.28
throughout the nineteenth-century United States, it was most widely used in the Southern states after the
Civil War. This development was in part a function of the serious financial straits of the former
Confederate states in the postwar years; convict leasing offered a way both to defray the costs of
incarceration and to rebuild the shattered Southern economy.”).
22
Dolovich, supra note 14, at 451.
23
Bauer, supra note 16, at 19; Dolovich, supra note 14, at 451 (“These contracts [between state and private
interests] took many forms. In some cases, as with New York’s Auburn penitentiary, contractors would
supply the raw material and collect the finished product at the end, with the work taking place at the prison.
In others, as in Louisiana, the state leased its entire penitentiary to a private contractor, who then assumed
the cost of running the facility in exchange for the labor of its inmates. The most common arrangements,
however, involved the leasing of convict labor for work on plantations, on railroads, in mines, or in other
labor-intensive industries.”).
24
Bauer, supra note 16, at 19 (“Like prison systems throughout the South, Texas’s grew directly out of
slavery. After the Civil War the state’s economy was in disarray, and cotton and sugar planters suddenly
found themselves without hands they could force to work. Fortunately, for them, the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery, left a loophole. It said that ‘neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude’ shall exist in the United States ‘except as punishment for a crime.’ As long as black men were
convicted of crimes, Texas could lease all of its prisoners to private cotton and sugar plantations and
companies running lumber camps and coal mines, and building railroads. It did this for five decades after
the abolition of slavery, but the state eventually became jealous of the revenue private companies and
planters were earning from its prisoners. So, between 1899 and 1918, the state bought ten plantations of its
own and began running them as prisons.”).
25
Dolovich, supra note 14, at 452–53 (detailing conflict between public and private interests as prison
labor contracts grew more and more popular).
26
Id. at 452 (“Because the prisons ensured a steady supply of convicts, from the contractors’ perspective
one convict was as good as another. Many contractors therefore routinely worked their charges literally to
death.”); see also Bauer, supra note 16, at 16–20 (recounting the experience of Albert Race Sample, a man
in prison in Texas and forced to work on a cotton plantation in 1956).
27
Dolovich, supra note 14, at 452–53 (“Historical accounts of inmate labor contracts in nineteenth-century
America reveal that the practice was plagued by more than inmate abuse. In addition, state after state found
itself being outmaneuvered and taken advantage of by the private parties with whom the state had
contracted for the labor of its convicts . . . The predominant theme of accounts of prison labor contracts
gone awry is the state’s vulnerability to nonperformance by its contracting partner once the state had
divested itself of responsibility for its prisoners.”).
28
Id. at 454 (“It would be a mistake to draw too many conclusions from this history for the current chapter
of private sector involvement in prisons. The contemporary experience is governed by a set of norms, not in
place a century ago, forbidding the economic exploitation and physical abuse of inmates. Today, there is
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The 1980s saw a rise in incarceration on a mass scale on the criminal and civil sides
as well as a reemergence of privatized confinement.29 As state governments began
throwing more people behind bars, they needed space to confine them. Publicly run jails
and prisons were soon filled to capacity.30 Thus, the private sector stepped in to provide
that space.31
B. Privatized Immigration Detention
The modern for-profit prison sector is linked inextricably with immigration
detention.32 Indeed, the first privately owned prison in the United States was an
immigration prison.33 The early 1980s saw the arrival of large numbers of Cuban and
Haitian migrants and refugees.34 As a result the Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA), now known as CoreCivic,35 opened the Houston Processing Center, a motel that
was converted to an immigration detention center, in Houston, Texas.36 CCA co-founder
Tom Beasley described on national radio the casual manner in which he launched his
exceedingly profitable business model in partnership with former pastor and prison
plantation warden, T. Don Hutto:37
Don Hutto and I went down to Houston on New Year’s Eve in 1983. We
rented a car at the airport and drove around the major thoroughfares to find
also a stricter standard of political accountability, an extensive public bureaucracy with the capacity to
regulate and administer complex institutions, and the default expectation that the state bears the burden of
financing the prison system. But as will be seen, this history does introduce certain themes arising from
private involvement in corrections that are still relevant today.”).
29
See, e.g., Danielle C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immgration Detention, 95
INDIANA L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); Dolovich, supra note 14, at 455 (“The
reemergence of private contractors in American corrections is traceable to the dramatic growth in
incarceration nationwide over the past three decades. In 1985, there were over 740,000 people behind bars,
up from 226,000 ten years previously.”).
30
Dolovich, supra note 14, at 455 (“Initially, state officials nationwide responded to the first of these
problems—finding room for all the bodies—by shipping convicted offenders to existing penal facilities and
letting the wardens sort it out themselves. The limitations of this approach, however, were soon clear, as
prisons and jails quickly came to be operating well over capacity.”).
31
Id. at 455–56.
32
For a fuller account of the rise of modern immigration confinement, see Danielle C. Jefferis,
Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immgration Detention, 95 INDIANA L.J. ___ (forthcoming
2019) (on file with author).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Devlin Barrett, Private-Prison Firm CCA to Rename Itself CoreCivic, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-prison-firm-cca-to-rename-itself-corecivic-1477666800 (last visited
Dec. 8, 2018).
36
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK & CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BANKING ON DETENTION:
LOCAL LOCKUP QUOTAS AND THE IMMIGRANT DRAGNET 3 (2015); Madison Pauly, A Brief History of
America’s Private Prison Industry, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 2016),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry-timeline/;
CHRISTINE BACON, THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UK: THE INVOLVEMENT OF
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES, REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE WORKING PAPER NO. 27 10 (2005).
37
Shane Bauer, supra note 16, at 21 (“Before running prisons, Hutto had been a pastor, studied history,
spent two years in the US Army, and did graduate work in education at the American University in
Washington, DC.”).
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somewhere to put 200 illegal criminal aliens by February 1st. Literally, we
stopped in ten motels, then finally about 3am found one that might work. I
asked if they would be interested in selling or leasing the motel. And after
negotiating with the owner for several hours, he finally agreed.38
Three years later, the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, now known as the GEO
Group, Inc. (GEO), received its first contract to run an immigration detention center.39 And
with that, the industry’s two primary players today launched what has become an empire.40
C. Scope
Not only is the American immigration detention system the largest in the world, it is
the most privatized in the world.41 Nearly 400,000 people are incarcerated under the
government’s immigration detention authority each year, an annual figure that has seen
consistent, substantial growth.42 The average daily population of people in immigration
confinement has also increased exponentially in the past two decades,43 reaching nearly
40,500 people per day in 2017.44 The federal government anticipated an even greater need
to fund additional confinement when U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
requested additional funding for up to 52,000 daily beds in fiscal year 2019.45 After an
intense budget debate during the federal government shutdown that began in 2018 and
carried into 2019, Congress declined ICE’s request and authorized detention-bed funding
at 2018 levels—40,500 per day—in spite of Democrats’ efforts to reduce the number of
detention beds even further.46 Notwithstanding Congress’s appropriated numbers, ICE
regularly detains more people than its funding permits.47
38

BACON, supra note 36, at 10. See also Bauer, supra note 16, at 14–15 (describing CoreCivic training
video: "In the video Hutto and Beasley tell their company's origin story. In 1983, they recount, they won
'the first contract ever to design, build, finance, and operate a secure correctional facility in the world.' . . .
[Hutto] recalls the story of obtaining their first prison contract like an old man giving a blow-by-blow
accounting of his winning high school touchdown. Rushed for time, he and Beasley convinced the owner of
a motel in Houston to lease it to them, eventually hiring 'all his family' as staff to seal the deal. They then
quickly surrounded the motel with a twelve-foot fence topped with coiled barbed wire. They left up the
Day Rates Available sign. 'We opened the facility on Super Bowl Sunday the end of that January,' Hutto
recalls. 'So about ten o'clock that night we start receiving inmates. I actually took their pictures and
fingerprinted them. Several other people walked them to their 'rooms,' if you will, and we got our first day's
pay for eighty-seven undocumented aliens.' Both men chuckle.").
39
Pauly, supra note 36.
40
For a fuller account of the history of immigration detention, including its privatization, see, e.g., Danielle
C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 INDIANA L.J. ___
(forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
41
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, A TOXIC RELATIONSHIP: PRIVATE PRISONS AND U.S. IMMIGRATION
DETENTION 2 (2016) (“[I]n addition to being remarkable for its size, the U.S. immigration detention system
is an outlier for the degree to which it has been privatized.”).
42
See, e.g., Danielle C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95
INDIANA L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF at 36 (2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf.
46
Dara Lind, Congress’s Deal on Immigration Detention, Explained, VOX (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/2019/2/12/18220323/immigration-detention-beds-congress-cap.
47
See, e.g., Caitlin Emma & Jennifer Scholtes, Trump Administration Aims to Shift Money to Immigration
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According to a 2018 report, ICE relies on more than 630 sites throughout the United
States to confine people under its immigration-enforcement authority.48 Many of these
facilities are state prisons or local jails that contract with the federal government to confine
people among its own authority.49 Others are for-profit prisons run by private corporations
and designed exclusively (or nearly exclusively) to detain people in the custody of
immigration-enforcement authorities.50
D. Conditions
Conditions in private immigration prisons are poor. Detainees have succumbed to
limb amputations, serious illnesses, and infections, and some have even died.51 ICE has
acknowledged at least 185 deaths in immigration prisons and jails between October 2003
and July 2018.52 At least twenty-two people have died in ICE custody in the last two
years.53 Others, still, have endured physical abuse at the hands of staff and otherwise harsh
conditions of confinement.54
Indeed, the Department of Justice reported in 2019 that the number of people who
had applied for voluntary departure since the 2016 election had risen significantly,
Enforcement, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/14/trump-administrationfederal-funding-ice-1662256.
48
EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, supra note 17, at 1.
49
Id. at 11 (“In fiscal year 2015, ICE used 638 facilities to detain noncitizens, including juveniles. By far,
the largest category—43 percent—were facilities with intergovernmental service agreements (IGSAs).
IGSAs are agreements between the federal government and a state or local government to provide detention
beds in jails, prisons, or other local or state government detention facilities. These facilities are government
owned, but they may be operated by either local or state agencies or by for-profit companies.”).
50
Some immigration detention centers, such as the Aurora ICE Processing Center in Colorado, also confine
people in the custody of the U.S. Marshals. See Our Locations: Aurora ICE Processing Center, THE GEO
GROUP, INC., https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/31 (last visited May 8, 2019).
51
See, e.g., Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Democrats Probe ICE About Medical Conditions at Aurora
Detention Facility,” VICE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.westword.com/news/jason-crow-sends-iceletter-about-medical-conditions-at-aurora-detention-facility-11252339 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Chris
Walker, There’s Been Another Chicken Pox Outbreak at Immigrant Detention Facility, WESTWORD (Jan.
31, 2019), https://www.westword.com/news/second-chicken-pox-outbreak-at-aurora-immigrant-detentioncenter-puts-two-pods-in-quarantine-11210867 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Lisa Riordan Seville et al., 22
Immigrants Died in ICE Detention Centers During the Past 2 Years, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/22-immigrants-died-ice-detention-centers-during-past-2years-n954781 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Pauly, supra note 36; Kassi Nelson, Trans Woman Dies in ICE
Custody; Family Sues, KOB4 (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.kob.com/albuquerque-news/trans-woman-diesafter-detained-at-new-mexico-ice-facility/5157737/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Chris Walker, ICE Defends
a Chicken Pox Quarantine at Immigrant Detention Facility in Aurora, WESTWORD (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.westword.com/news/varicella-outbreak-leads-to-a-quarantine-at-ice-detention-center-inaurora-10941507. See generally, CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD
MEDICAL CARE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION, Human Rights Watch, et al. (2018),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0618_immigration_web2.pdf.
52
Ryo & Peacock, supra note 17, at 5.
53
Lisa Riordan Seville et al., supra note 51.
54
See, e.g., Nina Shapiro, What Happened to Mergensana Amar? The Russian Immigrant’s Handwritten
Note Raises Questions about Treatment at Northwest Detention Center, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/russian-immigrants-handwritten-note-leaves-many-questionsabout-treatment-at-northwest-detention-center/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Alice Speri, At Largest ICE
Detention Center in the Country, Guards Called Attempted Suicides “Failures”, INTERCEPT (Oct. 11,
2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/10/11/adelanto-ice-detention-center-abuse/.
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suggesting that for some people, the conditions in immigration detention are so dire that
they would prefer to self-deport than stay in detention to fight their immigration cases.55
Laura Rivera, an attorney with the Southern Povery Law Center, told Politico Magazine,
“It speaks to the desperation of people in detention that they’d be trying to sign up in droves
for this thing that actually causes them to be removed. They’ve got to be thinking that
there’s no way out [of detention].”56 Alejandra Garcia Zamarrón, a woman whose case
Politico featured, told the publication of the women with whom she was detained at the
for-profit Irwin County Detention Center:57 “They’re tired of living here, of dealing with
ICE, dealing with guards, dealing with injustice . . . They give up. They’d rather be
deported than fight their case. We’re not criminal[s]. We just don’t have options.”58
E. Profits
Notwithstanding the conditions in private immigration prisons, the companies
overseeing and managing the facilities have yielded substantial profits and growing
revenue in recent years. GEO has reported regular profit increases over the last few years.59
In 2018, GEO reported more than $2.3 billion in revenue, compared to just above $2.2
billion in 2017 and nearly $2.18 billion in 2016.60 CoreCivic reported more than $1.8
billion in total revenue for 2018 after generating more than $1.7 billion in 201761 and
reported continued growth through the first quarter of 2019.62 In recent years, whenever
the Trump administration has announced a new tough-on-immigration policy, these
companies’ shareholders have seen a rapid spike in stock value.63 Their contracts with ICE
totaled approximately $2 billion each year.64
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
While conditions in private immigration prisons are poor, the industry continues to
Christie Thompson & Andrew R. Calderon, The Surprising New Effect of Trump’s Immigration
Crackdown, POLITICO (May 8, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/05/08/selfdeportation-trump-immigration-policy-trend-226801.
56
Id.
57
The Irwin County Detention Center is run by LaSalle Corrections, a private corporation operating prisons
in Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia. See generally, LaSalle Corrections,
http://www.lasallecorrections.com/about-us/ (last visited May 8, 2019).
58
Thompson and Calderon, supra note 55.
59
THE GEO GROUP, INC., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018).
60
Id.
61
CORECIVIC, ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2018).
62
GlobeNewswire, CoreCivic Reports First Quarter 2019 Financial Results, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 8,
2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/corecivic-reports-first-quarter-2019-201500242.html (reporting
total Q1 revenue was $484.1 million, up ten percent from prior quarter year).
63
See, e.g., John Washington, Trump’s Immigration Policy ‘Fever Dream,’ THE NATION (Oct. 5, 2018),
available at https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-immigration-policy-fever-dream/ (last visited March
2, 2019) (“[B]etween the announcement of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy and DHS’s June 22 request for
information about the possibility of detaining an additional 15,000 people in family jails, the stocks of Geo
Group and CoreCivic, the two largest for-profit immigration-detention corporations, increased 5.9 percent
and 8.3 percent, respectively.”).
64
See, e.g., John Burnett, Big Money as Private Immigrant Jails Boom, NPR (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/21/565318778/big-money-as-private-immigrant-jails-boom (last visited
March 2, 2019) (“ICE spends more than $2 billion a year on immigrant detention through private jails”).
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expand and reap profits at record levels.65 Calls for change and effective public governance
have largely fallen short at the federal level; however, some activity on state and local
levels has been more promising. Still, those efforts have yet to make substantial progress
toward stalling or shrinking the scope of the privatized immigration-detention apparatus.
A. Federal Oversight
A primary means of federal government oversight is through each agency’s Office
of Inspector General (OIG). The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) OIG has
attempted to investigate and report on conditions and concerns in private immigration
prisons, but the effect of those efforts has been nearly imperctible.66 In September 2018,
for example, the OIG issued a report after a surprise visit documenting troubling conditions
in GEO’s Adelanto Processing Center, an immigration detention facility.67 The report
detailed inspectors’ discovery of nooses in cells, misuses of solitary confinement, and
delayed medical care.68 Two weeks later, in a rebuke of the OIG’s report, GEO hired a
private company to conduct another inspection of the Adelanto Processing Center.69 The
inspector of the private company, the Nakamoto Group, disagreed with the OIG’s report,
65

See, e.g., DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, supra note 3, at 4; Norman Merchant, New deal keeps open
facility that detains immigrant families, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/new-deal-keeps-open-facility-that-detains-immigrantfamilies/2018/10/17/31f50118-d22b-11e8-a4db-184311d27129_story.html; Jackie Speier, Immigration
detention is a profitable business, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://realm.hearstnp.com/connect/authorize?client_id=hdn.js&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sfchr
onicle.com%2Fhdn%2Fhrlm%2Fp%2Fcallback.html&response_type=id_token%20token&scope=openid%
20email%20hdn.sanfrancisco&state=dcc4a7c671134b7ba6c3aa63b41bf0ad&non; Carli Pierson, Don’t be
Fooled by Trump’s Caravan Rhetoric - it’s Much More Profitable to Incarcerate Migrants Than to Stop
Them at the Border, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/trump-caravanmigrants-detention-centres-ice-child-separation-a8610146.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2018); Pauly, supra
note 36; CARL TAKEI ET AL., SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS: WHY AND HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP USING PRIVATE PRISONS, ACLU 10,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/white_paper_09-30-16_released_for_web-v1opt.pdf ("These trends have enriched private prison investors. In 2008, the two biggest private prison
companies—Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group (GEO)—received a combined
$307 million in revenue from ICE detention contracts. By 2015, that number had more than doubled, to
more than $765 million.”); Esther Fung, Donald Trump Has Been Very Good for Publicly Listed Prison
Owners, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-has-been-very-good-forpublicly-listed-prison-owners-11551189601 (last accessed March 2, 2019).
66
See, e.g., Katherine Hawkins, POGO Testimony on Oversight of ICE Detention Centers, PROJ. ON GOV’T
OVERSIGHT (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.pogo.org/testimony/2019/09/pogo-testimony-on-oversight-ofice-detention-centers/ (describing “serious flaws in ICE’s inspection and oversight system and inhumane
conditions in ICE detention centers”).
67
Office of Inspector GEN., Management Alert⎯Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing
Center in Adelanto, California (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/201810/OIG-18-86-Sep18.pdf.
68
Catherine E. Shoichet, Inspectors Found Nooses Hanging in Cells at an ICE Detention Facility, CNN
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/03/politics/immigrant-detention-adelanto-oigreport/index.html.
69
Katherine Hawkins, At Immigration Detention Facilities, ‘Inspectors for Hire’ Miss Signs of Neglect, Say
Critics, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/at-immigration-detention-facilitiesinspectors-for-hire-miss-signs-of-neglect-say-critics090000015.html;_ylt=AwrC1DG_qodcniUAlg7QtDMD;_ylu=X3oDMTByOHZyb21tBGNvbG8DYmYxB
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calling it “erroneous and inflammatory.”70 The company recommended that the OIG
should “use inspectors with detention and corrections backgrounds for future inspections
to avoid . . . embarrassment to their office and ICE, especially since the inaccuracies have
now been reported by the news media as fact.”71 Notwithstanding the company’s
representations, Nakamoto’s report contradicts not only the OIG’s report but also evidence
of advocacy groups and the primary accounts of formerly detained individuals.72
Another primary means of exercising oversight and imposing measures of
accountability on private immigration prisons is through congressional action. Members of
Congress have attempted to exercise oversight over private immigration prisons, only to
be rebuffed by the DHS. Representative Jason Crow, whose Colorado district serves as
home to GEO’s Aurora ICE Processing Center, attempted numerous times to visit the
facility after hearing of infectious disease outbreaks and other concerns about conditions
among individuals detained there and other concerns about conditions.73 ICE and GEO
refused to permit his inspections until a pre-approved visit was scheduled twenty-four days
after his first attempt.74 He and fellow members of Congress sent a letter in February 2019
to then-Secretary of DHS Kirstjen Nielsen, requesting documentation and information
about ICE’s infectious disease protocol.75 This request went unanswered.76 Crow is now
leading an effort that would require immigration detention prisons to allow members of
Congress to inspect their facilities within forty-eight hours of their request for such an
inspection.77 The coalition’s letter to the Appropriations Subcommitee on Homeland
Security details the myriad concerns with private immigration prisons across the country.78
Lastly, with the possible exception of labor rights and wage theft class action lawsuits
around the country,79 the judiciary is largely ill-equipped to provide oversight with respect
to private immigration prisons because there are few federal causes of action available to
bring private-prison actors into federal court.80
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Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Democrats Probe ICE About Medical Conditions at Aurora Detention
Facility, WESTWORD (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.westword.com/news/jason-crow-sends-ice-letter-aboutmedical-conditions-at-aurora-detention-facility-11252339.
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Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Crow, supra note 73.
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Letter to Chairwoman Lucille Roybal-Allard and Ranking Member Chuck Fleischmann, Appropriations
Subcomm. on Homeland Security, U.S. H.R. (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://images.westword.com/media/pdf/fy_2020_ice_detention_center_oversight_letter_w_sigs__1_.pdf.
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See, e.g., Complaint (Doc. 1), Menocal v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02887-JLK-MEH (D.
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B. State and Local Efforts
Public governance on the state and local levels may provide some measure of
accountability, but have likewise fallen short, particularly in terms of advancing the goal
of decarceration. Recently, activists in Illinois successfully lobbied the state legislature to
extend a state-wide ban on private prisons to apply to immigration detention facilities.81
The City of Adelanto, California decided to end its contract with GEO for the Adelanto
ICE Processing Center, just weeks after the Orange County Sheriff announced he would
no longer detain people in ICE custody in the county jail.82 Several weeks after the City’s
announcement, however, ICE suggested it would contract directly with GEO to keep the
prison open while members of the city council asked to revisit the decision, questioning
whether the city manager has the authority to unilaterally withdraw the locality from its
contract with GEO.83 In response, California’s Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law a
commitment to ending most forms of privatized confinement in the state, including
privatized immigration detention.84 Reportedly, ICE “stands to lose four privately run
detention facilities holding roughly 4,000 people in California, unless the ban is challenged
in court.”85 The law is slated to go into effect next year.86
But days after the law’s passage, ICE posted a solicitation notice for three new
detention facilities, with a total capacity of 6,750 people, seemingly in an attempt to open
new private immigration detention facilities before the law takes effect.87 The notice seeks
“turnkey ready” facilities and clarifies that the agency “will not accept proposals for
constructing new facilities.88 The notice gave about two weeks for response.89 California’s
legislation prevents the state from entering into any new contracts with private prison
companies or renewing existing contracts—but only once the law takes effect.90 If ICE
succeeds in securing the three new contracts in response to its solicitation, it appears those
agreements would not be subject to the new law.91
These efforts at the state and local level in Illinois and California are promising
James Goodman, Saying ‘No’ to Immigrant Detention, PROGRESSIVE (May 8, 2019),
https://progressive.org/dispatches/saying-no-to-immigrant-detention-goodman-190508/.
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Roxana Kopetman, Adelanto To End Immigrant Detention Contract with ICE, GEO Group, SAN
BERNARDINO SUN (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sbsun.com/2019/03/28/adelanto-to-end-immigrantdetention-contract-with-ice-geo-group/.
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Facility, DESERT SUN (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2019/04/11/adelanto-wants-revisit-decisionending-immigrant-detention-facility-contract/3437933002/.
84
See, e.g., Steve Gorman, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers, REUTERS
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-prisons/california-bans-private-prisons-andimmigration-detention-centers-idUSKBN1WQ2Q9.
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Id.; see also Darwin Bond Graham, California Governor Signs Ban on Private Prisons, Setting Up Fight
with Trump, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/11/californiaprivate-prison-ban-courts.
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advances toward enforcing oversight mechanisms, resisting privatized immigration
detention, and furthering the decarceration goal; however, they can go only so far. To date,
issues of federalism and company strategy have precluded state and local efforts from
having a substantial impact. Turning to private governance institutions may be necessary.
III. TURNING TO PRIVATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
When the government fails to govern in a manner certain people or groups desire,
those people and groups may turn to private governance institutions to govern or try to
change the status quo.92 Private governance institutions are the means by which
individuals, organizations, and communities aim to address the needs public governance
has failed to address.93 In other words, “[p]rivate governance institutions provide
governance without government.”94 This Part provides an overview of modern private
governance movements and then discusses recent developments of private governance
efforts with respect to privatized immigration confinement. Although nascent, these recent
developments suggest private governance is one means by which people and groups have
opposed to federal immigration-enforcement authorities’ increased reliance on migrationrelated detention. The efforts may put meaningful pressure on the companies on which the
government relies, in turn, to slow the growth of the immigration-detention apparatus.
A. Private Governance, Generally
Private governance institutions may take many forms.95 One area in which private
governance institutions have been particularly active in recent years is with respect to
environmental regulation. In this space, private entities have engaged in varied efforts
across industries to advance environmental policies and practices that public regulation has
failed to do.96 Within this movement, scholars have focused largely on two areas of private
activity: shareholder actions and divestment campaigns.97
These two areas highlight two primary means of private governance: divestment
versus engagement, or “carrots” versus “sticks.”98 Each serves different but related goals.
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 9, at 67; Jonathan M. Gilligan, supra note 13, at 182 (“Private governance
occurs when private entities—businesses, not-for-profit organizations, individuals, etc.—pursue a goal
traditionally associated with public governance, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, through
actions that produce broad influence over others.”).
93
Roberts, supra note 9, at 67 (“Private governance institutions are limitless in their variety. Political
science, sociology, law, and economics literature describes hundreds of variations of private governance
institutions throughout the world that have developed their own community-based rules for resource
management and conflict resolution.”).
94
Id. at 67. For a full account and analysis of the theory of private governance institutions, see Professor
Roberts’s full piece. See generally id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 68 (describing “education and mobilization initiatives, firm contractual agreements, corporate
social responsibility programs, socially responsible investment, codes of conduct, environmental
management systems, disclosure and reporting initiatives, learning initiatives, models and meta-standards,
cooperatives, and voluntary standards, certification, and labeling mechanisms”).
97
See generally Jonathan M. Gilligan, supra note 13; Surbhi Sarang, Combating Climate Change Through
a Duty To Divest, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 295 (2016); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2013).
98
Gilligan, supra note 13, at 188–89.
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Divestment or “exit” “can serve to disassociate investors from firms they find morally
repugnant or embarrassing to be publicly assocated with.”99 Critics often view “exit” as a
crude, all-or-nothing tool, “with little nuance and prone to backfiring.”100 The impact is
driven largely by the scope of divestment. If the campaign is one involving individual
activist-investors, and their fraction is small, their divestment will likely not effect the
corporatin’s market value in any meaningful way.101 Such efforts may embolden the
corporation to continue on the path that inspired the divestment in the first place, while
rendering the once-activist-investors voiceless and unable to make any further impact.102
The “exit” may have “sent a message” but the impact of that message is often difficult to
measure or impermanent unless the “exiter” is large enough to garner attention or inflict
reputational harm.103
Engagement, on the other hand, may provide a more nuanced form of private
governance than divestment or “exit.” That is, when shareholders remain engaged in the
corporation and take action from within, their voice may be louder.104 “Voice-centered
engagement offers greater opportunity for nuance and give-and-take than divestment . . .
Not only among investors but more broadly throughout society, voice has been an underutilized response to dissatisfaction. Thus, voice is more likely to be noticed when it is
used.”105
Recent shareholder and divestment actions targeted at the for-profit prison industry
and, specifically, privatized immigration detention show that these private governance
efforts may be more effective than the public governance activities discussed in Part II
when it comes to detention oversight and advancing decarceration.
B. Private Governance of Privatized Incarceration
1. Shareholder Actions
Corporate shareholders have taken action recently in at least two notable ways with
respect to privatized immigration confinement. In late 2018, shareholders of GEO and
CoreCivic filed shareholder resolutions against both companies seeking to prevent the
entities from separating migrant families apprehended at or near the U.S.-Mexico border.106
99

Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
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Id.
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Id. (“If demand for shares is inelastic, and if activists constitute a small fraction of investors, then
divestment will not affect a firm’s market value. Therefore, the effect of an exit would largely be to remove
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103
Id. at 190–91 (“Proponents of divestment argue that the most important and influential consequences of
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investors tend to get significant media coverage, which can damage companies’ reputations.”).
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Press Release, Prison Legal News, Family Separation Shareholder Resolution Filed with CoreCivic,
GEO Group, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.humanrightsdefensecenter.org/action/news/2018/family-separation-shareholder-resolutionfiled-corecivic-geo-group/ [hereinafter Prison Legal News, Family Separation]; see also Press Release,
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The supporting statement detailed the track record of systemic concerns over conditions in
GEO and CoreCivic immigration prisons, outlining a history of sexual abuse complaints,
hunger strikes, deaths in custody, and labor violations.107 Both companies objected to the
proposed resolutions and asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue a
“no-action” ruling, meaning the SEC would not recommend or take enforcement action
against the companies.108 They also requested the SEC exclude the proposed resolutions
from the shareholder’ packets distributed at the companies’ annual meetings and from a
shareholder vote.109 The SEC upheld the companies’ objections, precluding the resolutions
from reaching the shareholders. However, these shareholder actions placed both companies
under public scrutiny, drawing SEC and media attention.110
In 2019, GEO shareholders successfully passed a resolution demanding GEO to
better report human rights policies and violations to investors.111 Specifically, the proposed
resolution “asks GEO’s board [to] report annually on how the Company implements the
portion of its Global Human Rights Policy that addresses ‘Respect for Our Inmates and
Detainees.’”112 The two paragraphs that comprise this portion of the policy describe the
company’s vision with respect to ensuring the safety and well-being of the people whom it
incarcerates, as well as its commitment to “support the ability of inmates and detainess to
develop the values and skills needed to complete their terms, and upon release, become
productive and law abiding members of society.113 Much like it did with the earlier
resolution, GEO responded to the proposal by requesting a “no-action” ruling but on this
proposal, the SEC disagreed.114 The proposed resolution went before the shareholders at
the company annual meeting. A majority of the shareholders passed the resolution, which
required GEO to release a human rights report—or, a Human Rights and Environmental,
Social & Governance (“ESG”) report—by September 2019.115
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Prisons, MIAMI NEW TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/geo-groupshareholders-concerned-about-human-rights-violations-at-private-prison-giant-11166775.
112
Letter from Reverend Bryan V. Pham, USA W. Soc’y of Jesus, to U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n Jesuits
West (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2019/usawestetal03151914a8.pdf.
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2. Divestment Activity
In March 2019, in an unprecedented move, JPMorgan Chase, one of the nation’s
largest banks, announced it would no longer finance or invest in private prison
corporations.116 In a written statement announcing the divestment, the company said,
“JPMorgan Chase has a robust and well-established process to evaluate the sectors that we
serve. As part of this process, we will no longer bank the private-prison industry.”117 Wells
Fargo soon followed.118 Stocks of the two largest private-prison companies took a drastic
hit in the aftermath of the banks’ announcements.119 Soon, at least six more of the nation’s
largest banks had committed publicly to ending financing for the private-prison industry,
leaving the industry with a reported eighty-seven percent financing gap, falling credit
ratings, and investor fallback.120 By October 2019, all publicly known banking partners for
one of the industry’s leaders had committed to withdrawing their financial support, and the
leading stock prices for the industry’s top companies were “near historic lows.”121 By one
report, the stock prices dipped to their lowest point since 2016, when the Obama
administration announced it was ending the use of private prisons on the federal level.122
Here, the voice of the “exiters” is a loud one. Unlike, perhaps, the exit campaigns of
individual activist-investors in other industries, the big banks’ divestment from the prison
prison industry has made a statement. The actions have garnered significant media
coverage.123 And others have taken notice, leading to the divestment or likely divestment
of several other major investors in the companies.124
Finance (Sept. 26, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/geo-group-publishes-first-ever-123000649.html.
The seventy-seven page report appears to focus on the second paragraph of the “Respect for Our Inmates
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as productive citizens.” GEO Continuum of Care: 2018 Annual Report,
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96

Vol. 15:1]

Danielle C. Jefferis

Indeed, the impacted private prison firms have had no choice but to also take notice.
In a quarterly earnings call, for example, GEO’s founder and CEO told shareholders, “We
recognize that media coverage of overcrowded border patrol facilities and the
announcement by a handful of our financial institutions discontinuing future financing has
caused volatility in our equity and debt markets.”125 He continued, “Our shareholders
should take comfort in knowing that we continue to have strong banking relationships with
several dozen lenders and financial institutions in our senior credit facility.”126 CoreCivic’s
CEO called the divestment actions “a result of politically motivated threats.”127
CONCLUSION
Immigration detention is expanding rapidly, with more than 52,000 people confined
pursuant to the federal government’s immigration-enforcement authority every day, and
approximately two-thirds of those people behind the walls of for-profit prisons.128
Conditions in the for-profit prisons are dreadful, leading to untreated medical conditions,
infectious disease outbreaks, and deaths.129 As described above, public governance has
come up short in recent years with respect to advancing the goal of decarceration and
improving conditions inside private immigration prisons.
Recent efforts of private governance institutions may fill in the gap. Shareholder
actions and divestment activity with respect to the private prison industry have garnered
significant attention. The GEO shareholders resolution led to the company’s first-ever
release of a social responsibility report. The major banks’ divestment from the privateprison industry represents a loss of millions of dollars of capital for the corporations
managing and profiting from privatized immigration detention, and sends a compelling
signal from Wall Street that a company’s conduct, not just its bottom line, matters. Stocks
of the two largest private-prison companies took a drastic hit in the aftermath of the banks’
announcements. Perhaps signalling that the strategy is advancing certain goals, GEO
warned its investors that growing public pressure to divest from the private prison industry
“could have a material adverse effect” on its business.130 In light of the ineffectiveness of
public governance institutions in this space, early outcomes suggest these sorts of private
governance institutions may be one promising method to draw attention to the scope of and
conditions in for-profit immigration detention centers, to improve those conditions, and to
stop the overall growth of the immigration detention apparatus.
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